

Bush: 2,912,790

FL 2000

Gore: 2,912,253

Nader: 97,421

If they had ranked:

<u>2.9 M</u>	<u>2.9 M</u>	<u>.1 M</u>
B	G	N
G	B	G
N	N	B

Using plurality system, B wins (narrowly)

Look at the pairs:

B vs G: B: 2,9 G: 3 G wins!

B vs N: B: 5.8 N: .1 B wins!

G vs N: C: 5.8 N: .1 G wins!

Notice G is the winner in any pairwise contest (involving G)

There's a name for that:

Def A candidate who would win in any pairwise matchup is called a Condorcet winner.

in FL2000, G was a Condorcet winner.

Theorem In an election there cannot be 2 different Condorcet winners.

Proof Imagine there were 2 Cond. winners, A & B. Then there will be a pairwise contest A vs B. Both A & B cannot both win, so one of them isn't a Cond. winner.

So it's impossible!

A new voting method:

Condorcet's Method Compare all candidates pairwise to find the condorcet winner, then they win the election.

So in FL 2000,

B wins with plurality,
C wins with Condorcet method.

37 voters example:

14	10	8	4	1
A	C	D	B	C
B	B	C	D	D
C	D	B	C	B
D	A	A	A	A

Find the winner
with Cond-

A vs B: A: 14 B: 23

→ A vs C A: 14 C: 23

A vs D A: 14 D: 23

→ B vs C B: 18 C: 19

B vs D B: 28 D: 9

→ C vs D C: 25 D: 12

C wins all their pairwise matchups,

so C is the winner using
Condorcet's method.

<u>12</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>2</u>	
A	B	C	B	
B	C	A	A	
C	A	B	C	

29 voters

A vs B A: 19 B: 10

A vs C A: 14 C: 15

B vs C B: 22 C: 7

No Condorcet winner.

Very often, there is no
Condorcet winner. \therefore

So we don't use it in the real world.

Another voting method:

The Borda Count

Each ranking position gets points.

last place : 0 pts
2nd to last : 1 pt, etc.

Add up the points, most points wins.

Ex 1

	1	1	1	pts
A	B	C		3
B	A	D		2
C	D	B		1
D	C	A		0

$$A : 3 + 2 + 0 = 5$$

$$B : 2 + 3 + 1 = 6$$

$$C : 1 + 0 + 3 = 4$$

$$D : 0 + 1 + 2 = 3$$

B wins

Ex 2

	3	2	
A	B	2	
B	C	1	
C	A	0	

$$A : 3 \cdot 2 + 2 \cdot 0 = 6 + 0 = 6$$

$$B : 3 \cdot 1 + 2 \cdot 2 = 3 + 4 = 7 \leftarrow B \text{ wins!}$$

$$C : 3 \cdot 0 + 2 \cdot 1 = 0 + 2 = 2$$

FL 2000

2.9	2.9	.1	
G	B	N	2
B	G	G	1
N	N	B	0

Borda:

$$B: 2.9 \cdot 1 + 2.9 \cdot 2 + .1 \cdot 0 = 8.7$$

$$G: 2.9 \cdot 2 + 2.9 \cdot 1 + .1 \cdot 1 = 8.8$$

$$N: 2.9 \cdot 0 + 2.9 \cdot 0 + .1 \cdot 2 = .2$$

G wins!